Product announcement post from **Block Engineering** signed by **Thomas Petersen** (*Principal Designer & Builder*), published on **August 18, 2026**, ~1,800 words across thirteen short sections, introducing **Buzz Projects** — a **software forge hosted on its own relay**: Git repositories, branches, pull requests, issues, review and merge, multi-repo projects, an activity feed, all linked to conversation channels. The post's standfirst and thesis: *« Coding agents are the terminal for your computer. Buzz is the terminal for your network. »* Three contributions. **(A) A trust doctrine grounded in *ex post* proof rather than *ex ante* authorization**: on one side *« No forced guardrails, no limitations on what your agents are allowed to help you with »*, on the other *« Every push, review, approval, and merge is a signed Nostr event. If an agent authors a patch, you can see which agent produced it and which human authorized that agent to act »*; the section closes on a stated direction — *« we are already exploring ideas around agent trust protocols informed by past behavior »*. **(B) Git interoperability without proprietary tooling**: *« These are standard git repositories… You can fetch, clone, pull, and push over plain Smart HTTP, with no custom tooling or wrapper CLI required »*, with the clé Nostr serving as a single identity — *« The same npub that signs your messages signs your pushes. »* **(C) A distinction between execution surface and network presence**: *« A terminal gives an agent somewhere to execute commands and change files, but it does not give it a persistent place in the network. Buzz does. »* The post produces no figures and contains no outbound links; it qualifies itself as preliminary six times (*« still very basic »*, *« fairly elementary »*, *« still under experiments »*), and Projects lives under the **Experiments** tab of Buzz Desktop.
#Buzz#Buzz Projects#Block
**Thomas Petersen** — *« Principal Designer & Builder »* chez **Block** · auteur unique et signataire du billet ; première apparition dans le corpus. Publié le **18 août 2026** sur le blog **Block Engineering**. Troisième signature Block sur Buzz en un mois · après Tyler Longwell (21 juillet) et Atish Patel (6 août) · et la première non-ingénieur.
Internal research report dated **August 12, 2026** consolidating, for presentation purposes, everything publicly documented about **Buzz** — **Block**'s humans + agents workspace, launched on **July 21, 2026** under the **Apache 2.0** license. It aggregates the two engineering posts already filed alongside the corporate announcement, the GitHub repository, press coverage, X, and **three independent hands-on accounts** that constitute the dossier's only non-self-reported data. **(A) A vocabulary gap documented by quotation**: **Jack Dorsey**'s launch tweet announces *"model-agnostic, decentralized, self-sovereign, and open source"*; Block's `ARCHITECTURE.md` states *"The relay is the single source of truth. All reads and writes flow through it. There is no peer-to-peer event exchange, no gossip, no replication."* The relay is therefore single and authoritative per community: Buzz's "decentralization" is an **organizational sovereignty** — self-hosting and portable identity — not network redundancy. **TFTC**'s formulation: *"Two of those three hold cleanly. The third needs a qualifier."* **(B) An asymmetry between demonstrated rigor and exploitation risk.** On one side, a rare degree of formalism for a v0.4.x/0.5.x: multi-tenant isolation specification **mechanized in TLA+**, authorization properties verified in **Tamarin**, a model-checked Git storage protocol, a hash-chained append-only audit log, 127 *event kinds*, NIP-01/42/98/34. On the other, channel membership is the unit of permission — *"channel membership is not fine-grained tool authorization"* (João Queirós) —, agents run in `--dangerously-skip-permissions` outside any sandbox on a human's machine, and observability is lacking: *"Buzz tells me an agent got a message. It doesn't tell me what happens next"* (DevTools Daily, which reports silent OOM kills). Block acknowledges it: *"the agent can do anything, and security rests entirely on restricting who can tell it what to do"*. **(C) The technical stack**, absent from the filed posts: **Rust** relay (Axum WS + REST), **Postgres**, **Redis**, **S3/MinIO** via Blossom, **Tauri + React** desktop client. Agent integration goes through **`buzz-acp`**, an **ACP** harness that plugs in goose, Codex and Claude Code and translates **ACP ↔ MCP**, plus **`buzz-agent`**, an in-house agent. The report corrects itself on one point: the *"+33% more work"* in Block's TL;DR is the **ratio of completed tasks (20 versus 15 out of 44)**, not a score gain — the score itself rises from 59.1% to 71.5%, i.e. **+12.4 points**.
#Buzz#buzz.xyz#Block
**Deep Research Veille Interne** — rapport non signé · produit le **12 août 2026** en préparation d'une présentation. Aucune URL publique ; source archivée dans `raw-data/`.
Tech-watch note by **Didier Girard** dated **August 2, 2026**, prompted by a colleague's question ("what is ACP?") to address a problem that is not terminological but **documentary**. **Three protocols compete for the acronym**, with no technical overlap whatsoever: **Agent Client Protocol** (client ↔ agent — Zed, August 2025, JSON-RPC 2.0 over stdio, Apache-2.0, "what LSP did for languages"), **Agentic Commerce Protocol** (agent ↔ merchant — OpenAI + Stripe, Sept. 29, 2025, competing with Google's **UCP** of Jan. 11, 2026 backed by **AP2**), and **Agent Communication Protocol** (agent ↔ agent — IBM Research / BeeAI, marginal but polluting searches). **The core of the note is not the disentangling but its observed failure**: the author searches "ACP" in their tech-watch knowledge base and gets **twelve results, all about the commerce protocol, zero about Zed's** — *"our watch agents had indexed the acronym without disambiguating it"*. Hence a knowledge-engineering rule: ***"a bare acronym is never indexed"*** — the entity is "Agent Client Protocol", "ACP" is **only an alias**, carried by three distinct entities. A structuring clarification follows (**MCP connects an agent to its tools, ACP connects a client to an agent; the two stack**), then the textbook case: **Buzz**, published by **Block** on July 21, 2026 under Apache-2.0 — a self-hostable workspace built on **Nostr**, where every human or agent participant is a **key pair** and every message, workflow step, or git push is a **signed event** in an append-only log. An entirely protocol-based architecture (`buzz-acp` an ACP harness over stdio, `buzz-agent` an ACP agent calling an LLM, `buzz-dev-mcp` an MCP shell + editing server), hence agent agnosticism: **Goose, Claude Code, and Codex** plug in through the same harness, and **Hermes** (Nous Research) connected to it without Block writing a single line — *"N+M instead of N×M, running in production"*. The note closes on the question of the **Claude subscription** versus third-party agents, with a five-stage 2026 timeline and a **design rule** that holds beyond this case: the line is not legal but **architectural** — ***"who is consuming, and on whose behalf"*** (an `owner-only` agent consumes your subscription on your behalf; an `anyone` agent in a shared channel routes your colleagues' requests through your account). **Verification carried out on this corpus**: the thesis holds, and more starkly than the note claims — not only is "Agent Client Protocol" **completely absent**, but the bare acronym `ACP` **is already typed as an entity** in two fiches, and the KB page `Agentic-Commerce-Protocol` **already attributes the protocol to Google** when it belongs to OpenAI + Stripe. The collision described is not a future risk: it has **already produced an attribution error** in the graph.
**Didier Girard** — auteur de la note. Écrit ici depuis la position de **praticien de la veille outillée** : le déclencheur est une question de collègue · le matériau principal est le comportement observé de sa propre base de connaissances · et la conclusion est une **règle de curation** adoptée en interne. Le texte alterne donc deux voix — l'explicateur de protocoles et l'ingénieur de la connaissance qui constate un défaut chez lui et en tire une norme.
**Block** announcement from **July 21, 2026**, signed by **Tyler Longwell**: **Buzz**, an *open source* and **self-hostable** channel-driven workspace where humans and agents share the same room — chat, search, automation, and **Git hosting** on a single server, built on **Nostr**, an open protocol for signed messages and portable identities. Opening thesis: *« Models can do the work now. Teams still need somewhere to do it together. The bottleneck moved from intelligence to coordination. »* Three engineering pieces. **(A) Agent identity.** The starting point is a refusal — to stop lending one's credentials to a bot: *« We have been letting bots play dress-up as us. It's weird. It's dangerous. »* Each agent gets **its own key**, its owner signs a **narrowly scoped authorization**, and the agent then signs its work with its own identity. The delegation cryptography is conventional; the design decision is less so: *« authorization does not erase authorship »* — the agent remains the author, its *credential* proving who authorized it and under what conditions. Immediate consequences: a leaked agent key is revoked without touching the human identity, and withdrawing the owner prevents the agent from reconnecting, with its active sessions needing to be terminated separately. **(B) Git on object storage.** The observation: *« In the past, Git has always had a convenient rate limiter: humans »* — a group of agents produces months of person-commits and CI in a single afternoon, with many simultaneous writers, on forges sized for human fingers. Buzz stores repositories as **immutable, content-addressed packfiles** plus a **single mutable manifest pointer**; a *push* writes the objects first, then advances the pointer via **conditional compare-and-swap**, that swap being the commit point — workspace events announce the change, they do not define it. The protocol is **specified in TLA+ and model-checked** (durability, reconstruction, concurrent pushes), with the bounded result depending on three explicit object-store guarantees, hence a **conformance suite** every backend must pass. **(C) Interoperability and privacy.** Claude Code, Codex, goose *« and any agent speaking Agent Client Protocol »* work inside Buzz; switching model or harness leaves the project's identity, permissions, and history intact. Telemetry and cancellation travel as ephemeral encrypted messages, memory and cost accounting as durable encrypted messages — *« the server sees routing metadata, not those payloads »*. Memory argument: *« A conventional forge preserves the diff and a green check. Buzz also preserves why the obvious fix was wrong. »* Anti-lock-in argument: if Buzz disappears, the identity and signed history remain verifiable, Git stays Git.
#Buzz#Block#agentic workspace
**Tyler Longwell** — *« Building multi-player AI at Block »* · auteur unique et signataire à la première personne. Publié le **21 juillet 2026** sur le blog Block Engineering.